The Financial Deepening-Productivity Nexus in China: 1987-2001 by Zhang, Jun et al.
 
Copyright  ©  UNU-WIDER 2007 
1China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University, Shanghai; 
2 World Institute for Development 
Economics Research, Helsinki; 
3Department of Economics, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. 
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER Sabbatical and Visiting Fellows programme, and is 
published in the project on Inequality and Poverty in China. 
UNU-WIDER acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme by the governments of 
Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Royal Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) and the United 
Kingdom (Department for International Development). 
ISSN 1810-2611     ISBN 92-9190-947-5   ISBN 13 978-92-9190-947-6 
Research Paper No. 2007/08 
 
The Financial Deepening–Productivity 











The financial intermediation–growth nexus is a widely studied topic in the literature of 
development economics. Deepening financial intermediation may promote economic 
growth by mobilizing more investments, and lifting returns to financial resources, which 
raises productivity. Relying on provincial panel data from China, this paper attempts to 
examine if regional productivity growth is accounted for by the deepening process of 
financial development. Towards this end, an appropriate measurement of financial depth is 
constructed and then included as a determinant of productivity growth. It finds that a 
significant and positive nexus exists between financial deepening and productivity growth. 
Given the divergent pattern of financial deepening between coastal and inland provinces, 
this finding also helps explain the rising regional disparity in China. 
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In the literature of development economics, it is generally held that the depth of financial 
development promotes economic growth in two ways. First, it facilitates resource 
mobilization, reduces the transaction costs of financing investments, and therefore, induces 
more investments (e.g., Merton and Bodie 1995). Second, it helps improve the allocative 
efficiency of financial resources, and thus lift the returns to financial resources, which raises 
productivity (e.g., King and Levine 1993; Beck et al. 2000). While the deepening financial 
development generally leads to increases in the level of and returns to investment in many 
economies, this may not be true in the case of China, however. For example, Lu and Yao 
(2004) found that the level of financial development did not have a statistically significant 
impact on growth. Meanwhile, Liang (2005) concluded that the impact of financial depth on 
growth is only apparent in coastal regions and not in the inland, implying regional variations 
in the financial deepening-growth relationship in China. 
 
Previous studies on China usually use total credit/GDP to measure the depth of financial 
intermediation. This ratio tends to overestimate the financial depth in China, and possibly 
discount the financial deepening-growth nexus, primarily due to both policy-directed 
lending and a large scale of non-performing loans in China’s banking sector. In a financially 
depressed economy like China, the deepening process of financial intermediation is 
normally defined as a process of banking liberalization from state control, reductions in or 
elimination of directed credits, and marketization of financial parameters (Shaw 1973; 
McKinnon 1973; King and Levine 1993). Without taking out directed credits and funds 
allocated to state-owned enterprises, the ratio of total credit to GDP is not an appropriate 
indicator of the depth of financial intermediation in China. As China gradually liberalizes 
her financial sector and implements relevant institutional changes, the rising depth of 
financial intermediation is most likely to be a result of commercialization of state banks and 
should be closely related to the change in the relative share of bank financing between state-
owned enterprises and a variety of newly emerged enterprises. Lack of data, however, 
prevents us from calculating the relative shares of bank lending to state or non-state sectors. 
Consequently, we propose an indirect measure by determining how much the total 
outstanding bank loan was granted to state and non-state sectors. The measure is then 
constructed as the ratio of credit for the non-state sector to GDP. Adding this indicator of 
financial deepening as an independent variable to the productivity growth model allows us 
to explore the relationship between financial depth and productivity growth in China. Our 
modeling results confirm a positive and significant impact of financial development on 
productivity, conditioning on a number of control variables. Such finding has important 
implication for and supports the necessity of both in-depth liberalization of the state banking 
sector and rapid privatization of locally owned state enterprises in China. 
 
The motivation of this paper is elaborated upon in Section 2, together with a review of 
existing literature. In Section 3, we define and construct an index, measuring the depth of 
financial development in China. Data issues are discussed in Section 4, where we 
empirically estimate the financial deepening–productivity nexus in China using a panel 
dataset covering 29 provinces over the period of 1987-2001. The standard growth 
accounting is employed to produce annual estimate of total factor productivity in each 
province. These estimates are then regressed on a set of independent variables. Finally, 
concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.  
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2  Motivation of research 
After more than a decade of silence following the pioneer work of Goldsmith (1969), Shaw 
(1973) and McKinnon (1973), the financial intermediation–growth nexus has returned as a 
widely studied topic in the literature of development economics since the 1990s. 
Notwithstanding controversies over the causal relationship between financial development 
and economic growth, dating back to the early 1950s, there has been growing consensus 
since 1990s that ‘Schumpeter might be right’. That is, services provided by financial 
development are essential to economic development (Levine 1997; King and Levine 1993; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990). This consensus leads to many empirical studies that 
attempt to verify the linkage between financial liberalization and economic growth using 
aggregate data from large cross sections of countries.1 
 
There are several channels through which the deepening process of financial development 
fosters economic growth. For instance, financial development can help mobilize savings 
into investment projects, an effect of mobilization (e.g., Merton and Bodie 1995). Also, it 
may help increase the marginal productivity of capital through the intermediation function 
of well-informed financial institutions, an effect of efficiency enhancement (e.g., King and 
Levine 1993; Beck et al. 2000). 
 
As a transition economy, China attracts considerable research interests, including those on 
bank-based financial intermediation. For example, Tan (1999), Zhou and Hu (2002), Lu and 
Yao (2004), Liang (2005), among others, constructed indicators of financial development 
and examined their impact on economic growth. However, these studies do not differentiate 
the mobilization effect from the efficiency effect. Rather, they simply regress GDP growth 
on an indicator of financial development. In this paper, we choose to focus on the efficiency 
effect by modeling the impact of financial development on productivity growth. As 
emphasized by Ezaki and Sun (1999) and Guo (2005), productivity growth has become 
increasingly important to promote economic growth, and to explain the regional imbalance 
in China. 
 
Another problem with existing studies on China relates to the measurement of financial 
deepening, mostly using M2/GDP, or total year-end credit/GDP or banking financial 
assets/GDP. These measures are found to be inappropriate. To demonstrate our finding, 
Figure 1 plots total credit/GDP and growth of per capita GDP for 29 provinces over the 
period of 1987-2001. The plot clearly shows a weak and negative correlation. Provided that 
GDP growth is measured with some precision, such a counterintuitive plot is indicative of 
measurement problem associated with financial depth. This is so despite concerns over how 
much efficiency gains has been made in allocating credits by China’s state banks (Cull and 
Xu 2000; Allen et al. 2005). Given the existence of policy lending and large scale non-
performing loans, these above-mentioned measures are expected to overestimate financial 
depth in less developed regions. And this will almost certainly yield misleading results 
regarding the financial intermediation–growth nexus in China. 
 
Both Liang (2005) and Lu and Yao (2004) also used bank loans to the private sector as a 
financial indicator in the explanation for economic growth in China, as suggested by King 
and Levine (1993). While Lu and Yao (2004) found a negative and insignificant 
relationship, the opposite was concluded by Liang (2005), but only for regions in the coastal 
                                                 
1   See Levine (1997) for a literature review. Guo (2005) prepared a comprehensive survey of literature.  
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area, not the inland provinces.2 The panel data on bank lending to the private sector used by 
Liang (2005) and Lu and Yao (2004) are not explained in detail. In particular, how they 
define the private sector remains unclear. To our best knowledge, no such data are 
published by China’s national authorities on a consistent base. If collected from individual 
provinces, consistency in definition and categorization across regions and over time may be 
questionable; see Zhou and Wang (2002) for discussion on the inconsistency issue in 
China’s financial statistics at the provincial level. In any case, bank lending to private 
enterprises may not reflect well the depth of financial intermediation in China. Several 
ownership types of enterprises exist which are between state-owned enterprises and private 
enterprises, including various joint ownership enterprises and FDI related companies. Most 
importantly, the well-known township and village enterprises (TVEs) are of collective 
ownership and they represent 30 per cent of the Chinese economy. Therefore, private credit 
as a percentage of GDP would underestimate the depth of financial intermediation in China. 
Figure 1: Total credit/GDP versus growth of per capita GDP 





















Note: This diagram is based on provincial panel data. ‘Growth’ is measured by annual growth rate of per capita 
GDP, and ‘loan’ is measured by total loan/GDP ratio. 
Sources: Authors’ calculation based on CCES dataset. 
 
In what follows, we will construct a variable measuring the depth of financial deepening, 
which excludes credits allocated to state-owned enterprises, but includes credits for all non-
state enterprises. This is appropriate as financial liberalization and commercialization of 
state banks in China are slowly implemented to facilitate the emergence of various non-state 
enterprises. For instance, collectively owned and joint ventures dominated many provincial 
economies from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s. After the mid 1990s, the number of 
private enterprises began to grow, partly due to privatization of state-owned enterprises. 
Across regions, both the extent of privatization and the importance of private enterprises 
vary considerably. As Figure 2 indicates, even today, apart from private enterprises, 




                                                 
2   Liang (2005) uses a dataset covering 29 Chinese provinces over the period of 1990-2001, while Lu and 
Yao (2004) use a dataset covering 28 Chinese provinces over the period of 1991-2001.  
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
State owned and collectively owned enterprises Privately owned enterprises  
Note: Credit allocated to those other than state-owned, collectively owned and private enterprises, is not 
included. 
Sources: China National Bureau of Statistics (various years).  
 
3  Estimating the depth of financial intermediation in China 
Note that the total bank loan can be classified into two components: that issued to state-
owned enterprises and the rest issued to all non-state enterprises. The first component as a 
percentage of the total loan is expected to be highly correlated with the output share of state-
owned enterprises, denoted by soe. This leads to the following equation: 
 
,1 1
it it i it







        ( 1 )  
 
where loan is the total loan as a percentage of GDP and subscripts i and t index regions and 
time. The term, βsoeit, captures the proportion of loan that is allocated to state-owned 
enterprises and other terms represent the share of loan allocated to non state enterprises. In 
(1), we specify a first order autoregressive (AR1) process to correct for serial correlation in 
the error term, νit. Table 1 reports estimation results. 
Table 1: Panel regression for total bank loan/GDP, 1987-2001(AR1/fixed effect) 
 coefficient  t-value 
SOE output/total output  0.507  8.45 
rho-ar 0.806   
R-sq 0.172   
observations 406   
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
 
Now we can compute the ratio of bank lending (to non-state sector only) to GDP for each 
province and each year between 1987 and 2001. This is obtained simply by deducting the 
values given by βsoeit from loanit. The computed ratios are averaged for the coastal and  
5 
inland areas3 and then plotted in Figure 3. The only difference between Figure 3(a) and 3(b) 
is that the level of financial deepening is estimated by total bank loan-to-GDP ratio in 3(a), 
while in 3(b), it is measured by bank loan to non-state sectors as a percentage of GDP. 
Figure 3(a) shows that, prior to discounting bank lending to state-owned enterprises 
(referring to the total credit-to-GDP ratio), the depth of financial development in the inland 
area is higher. But Figure 3(b) indicates the opposite. Figure 3(b) also depicts increasing 
variations in financial deepening, especially since mid 1997. 
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(b) 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on own estimates. 
                                                 
3   In the literature, the coastal region in China usually includes 12 provinces and municipalities, namely, 
Beijing, Tianjin, HeBei, Liaoning, Shangdong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan 
and Guangxi. The inland provinces include Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang (Tibet), Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and 
Xinjiang. In this study, we include Chongqing in Sichuan Province as Chongqing was granted the status of 
province-treated municipality in 1997, but we exclude Xizang (Tibet) from this research due to the lack of 
data. Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are not covered either here.  
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4  The financial development–productivity nexus in China 
We explore the financial development–productivity nexus by estimating fixed effects panel 
regressions. Apart from financial development which raises productivity, other variables 
can generate positive or negative impact on regional productivities and they need to be 
controlled for in the regression models. These control variables include level of 
urbanization, privatization, and opening up. Also institutional factors such as fiscal 
expenditure and governmental influence on bank lending are also considered. For a 
complete list of independent variables, see Table 2. 
 
The dependent variable is not directly observable and must be estimated. In this paper, we 
use standard growth accounting methodology to generate the series of total factor 
productivity. According to Solow (1957), an aggregate production function with neutral 
technological change can be written as (Y = output, K = capital, L = labour, A = technology 
parameter and t = time subscript): 
 
(,) t YA f K L =          ( 2 )  
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 is output elasticity of labour. Further assuming homogeneity of 
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Equation (4) will be used to estimate regional total factor productivity (TFP) and its 
growth.4 This dataset covers 29 provinces and municipalities for the period 1987-2001. 
Observations for real capital stock are sourced from Zhang et al. (2004). Rather than 
estimating the aggregate production function, we assume a value of 0.33 for wk. This is 
because most studies document output elasticity of capital between 0.3-0.6, and around 0.3 
for China. Estimates of TFP and TFP growth for selected years are presented in Table 3. 
Meanwhile, Figure 4 shows the average (over all regions) level and growth of TFP for the 






                                                 
4   The data we use for estimating (4) are from the China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University.  
7 
Table 2: Summary of variables 
Dep. variables:  GTFP  Growth of total factor productivity 
Indep. variables:      References: 
Initial state  GTFP88  growth of TFP in 1988   
      
Core variables:       
financial deepening  pLoan  bank lending to non-state   
   enterprises/GDP   
      
Fiscal spending  Exp  fiscal spending/GDP   
      
Gov’t intervention  Loan×Exp  bank loan×fiscal spending   
      
Control variables:       
investment Inv  fixed  investment/GDP   
      
Education Edu  average  years  of  schooling  Wan et al. (2006) 
      
Opening up  FDI  fdi/gdp  Dayal-Gulati and 
 Trade  trade/gdp  Husain  (2000) 
      
Privatization  NSOE  1-SOE employment/total  Chen and Feng (2000) 
   employment   
      
Urbanization  Urban  non-rural population/population  Chen and Lu (2004) 
Source: See text. 
 
In considering determinates of productivity, we include the fiscal expenditure-to-GDP ratio 
(Exp). This is dictated by the current literature, arguing that the ratio measures government 
intervention in economic development. While the ratio usually exerts a negative effect on 
economic growth elsewhere, in China, it may well be conducive to productivity 
improvement and economic growth (Qian and Weingast 1997; Cao et al. 1999). 
Nevertheless, the impact of Exp on productivity is likely to be related to financial deepening 
(Loan) in a region. In fact, some fiscal spending is probably financed by borrowing from 
banks, especially in inland provinces where the fiscal status of local governments was 
weakened by the 1994 intergovernmental fiscal reform (Dabla-Norris, 2005). Therefore, it 
is justified to include an interactive term in the productivity function, namely Loan×Exp. In 
calculating the fiscal expenditure-to-GDP ratio, an adjustment is made to deduct fiscal 
expenditure on sciences and technology, education and health as they do not reflect direct 





Table 3: Total factor productivity and its growth in provincial China for selected years 
(based on growth accounting) 








Beijing  275  6.05  322 10.00 414 8.25 495 5.65 
Tianjin  230  3.56  274 6.05  412 5.46 586 7.15 
Hebei  145  7.14  190 9.84  255 3.81 290 5.64 
Shanxi  132  3.50  161 4.55  205 5.06 220 4.42 
Inner  Mongolia  167  3.76  187 2.52  248 6.03 300 6.02 
Liaoning  239  5.69  274 7.09  366 5.78 455 5.06 
Jilin  199  6.15  215 6.93  309 5.80 401 6.84 
Heilongjiang  200  4.01  238 4.61  302 2.75 365 6.29 
Shanghai  330  4.44  404 5.93  570 6.44 790 4.75 
Jiangsu  198  10.32  263 11.20 383 5.13 465 5.74 
Zhejiang  186  4.16  259 13.05 369 4.86 418 3.64 
Anhui  136  -0.84  162 12.00 240 3.23 276 4.75 
Fujian  172  8.11  264 15.33 387 4.94 439 4.29 
Jiangxi  128  7.41  162 7.29  227 4.79 272 4.77 
Shandong  164  5.74  226 13.11 287 5.08 363 0.07 
Henan  119  2.68  146 10.15 193 1.42 208 5.77 
Hubei  178  2.96  230 8.77  324 4.27 374 3.72 
Hunan  141  1.96  178 8.06  239 4.28 284 5.39 
Guangdong  206  -10.38 308 11.52 405 3.79 462 3.64 
Guangxi  101  1.53  144 7.16  167 2.95 183 3.93 
Hainan  148  3.41  193 6.13  194 4.01 227 4.44 
Sichuan  97  2.97  128 9.60  173 5.34 197 5.08 
Guizhou  91  2.88  108 6.47  138 2.61 144 2.90 
Yunnan  107  11.00  124 4.20  156 2.65 169 2.74 
Shanxi  133  13.20  155 7.93  205 5.89 239 6.41 
Gansu  111  8.12  132 2.95  171 4.77 233 4.99 
Qinghai  130  3.25  138 2.28  166 3.81 197 5.47 
Ningxia  120  7.16  139 5.78  175 5.74 193 4.42 
Xinjiang  149  4.80  191 3.55  235 7.02 268 3.49 
Notes:   a: level of TFP, b: the growth of TFP. Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, and Tibet are not included due 
to the lack of data. Chongqing, though has become the province-equivalent municipality since 1997, 
is still included in Shichuan province. 




Figure 4: The level and growth of TFP in China (provincial averages), 1987-2001 
 
Sources: based on authors’ calculations. 
 
Other variables considered include education, fixed assets investment, foreign trade, foreign 
direct investments (converted from USD into Chinese RMB), and population. Apart from 
the education data which are taken from Wan, Lu and Cheng (2004), other observations are 
provided by the China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University. 
Our productivity model is specified as: 
 
,0 1 , 2 , 3 , , , , , 88 it i i it it it it j jit it GTFP a GTFP pLoan Exp Loan Exp Ctrl ρρ ρ ρ ρ ε =+ + + + × + Σ + (5) 
 
where GTFP = productivity growth, pLoan = financial deepening, Exp = fiscal expenditure 
as percentage of GDP, Ctrl = a vector of other variables discussed in the preceding 
paragraph. In addition, to allow for convergence in TFP, we include the 1988 TFP in the 
model (GTFP88 = initial value of productivity growth). As the estimation results will show, 
perhaps not surprisingly, divergence rather than convergence is found. To ensure reasonable 
precision of the ρ1 estimate, near perfect multicollinarity of pLoan and other variables 
should be avoided. It was found that this important variable is not highly correlated with 
any of the other variables in the model, the largest correlation coefficient being 0.59. 
 
Following the suggestion of a referee, we conducted unit root tests for all the variables in 
the model. Using the technique developed by Im et al. (2003), the variables of productivity 
growth, FDI and education are found to be stationary. All others are trend stationary. As a 
consequence, we added year dummy variables for 1989-2001 to (5). When these year 
dummies are included, it is not advisable to apply fixed-effect estimation as the large 
number of dummy variables will not only consume many degrees of freedom, but also lead 
to severe multicollinearity problem. Therefore, random-effect estimation will be applied to 
equation (5). In running the regression, we lagged those explanatory variables which we 
believe are potentially. The estimation results are reported in Table 4.5 
                                                 
5    The referee also suggested a restricted SUR to test the robustness of coefficients among provinces. 
However, as our data are available only from 1988 to 2001, the results may not reliable due to limiting time 
period. On the other hand, it is widely accepted that the behavior within a country are less heterogeneous 
than the cross-countries, therefore our models do not include restricted SUR.  
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Table 4: Determinants of productivity 
  Growth Rate of TFP (GLS with time dummies) 
Explanatory variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
TFP1988  0.1373 ***  0.1411 ***  0.1383 ***  0.1024 ***  0.1011 *** 
  (0.0464)   (0.0461)   (0.0458)   (0.0376)   (0.0374)  
Financial  deepening  0.0234   0.0102   0.0211 *  0.0233 *  0.0264 *** 
  (0.0209)   (0.0100)   (0.0132)   (0.0131)   (0.0102)  
Fiscal  spending/GDP  0.0247   -0.0892           
  (0.1721)   (0.0687)            
Loan×Fiscal  spending  -0.1188     -0.0971  -0.0928  -0.0880 * 
  (0.1644)      (0.0656)   (0.0656)   (0.0462)   
FDI/GDP  0.0538   0.0616   0.0549   0.1164 **  0.1321 *** 
  (0.0685)   (0.0676)   (0.0680)   (0.0512)   (0.0477)  
Trade/GDP  0.0145   0.0157   0.0148         
  (0.0110)   (0.0108)   (0.0108)         
Privatization  0.00005   0.00004   0.00004   0.00013      
  (0.0003)   (0.0003)   (0.0003)   (0.0003)      
Urbanization  0.0142   0.0129   0.0146   0.0181      
  (0.0220)   (0.0219)   (0.0218)   (0.0217)      
Education  -0.0017  -0.0013  -0.0018  -0.0021     
  (0.0038)   (0.0037)   (0.0037)   (0.0037)      
  
11 
Investment/GDP  -0.0573 ***  -0.0584 ***  -0.0574 ***  -0.0610 ***  -0.0660 *** 
  (0.0148)   (0.0147)   (0.0147)   (0.0145)   (0.0132)  
Constant  0.0589 **  0.0649 *  0.0612 ***  0.0631 ***  0.0585 *** 
  (0.0268)   (0.0255)   (0.0220)   (0.0219)   (0.0071)  
Time dummies  Omitted 
Observation 406 
R
2  0.404 0.403 0.404 0.401 0.399 
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. We omit reporting the time dummies due to space 
constraints. Source: See text.  
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Under Model 1, we run the regression on all right-hand variables. And we drop insignificant 
variables in the following models. As Fiscal spending/GDP and Loan×Fiscal spending, 
which character the intervention of government, are highly correlated (correlation 
coefficient being 0.85), we use each of them correspondingly in Model 2 and Model 3. The 
measure of goodness of fit suggests that Loan×Fiscal spending explains more. In Model 3 
we use both Trade/GDP and FDI/GDP, while in Model 4 we use FDI/GDP. This is because 
these two variables are correlated and it is unnecessary to include both in the model. Since 
FDI is expected to generate stronger positive influence on productivity than trade due to its 
spillover effects, we will use Model 4 and Model 5 in the following discussions. 
 
First, after controlling for other variables, the depth of financial intermediation exerts 
significantly positive influence on productivity growth in China during 1987-2001. This is 
true despite which model is used. This finding lends strong support to the existence of 
financial intermediation–growth nexus in post reform China. S e c o n d ,  w e  f i n d  t h a t  t h e  
coefficient for the interactive term between bank loan and fiscal spending is significantly 
negative in Model 5. Thus, governmental influence on bank lending is detrimental to 
productivity growth though fiscal expenditure may help improve productivity under a 
decentralized fiscal system. It is also interestingly to note that the coefficient of 
investment/GDP is both negative and significant. Such a finding is consistent with Zhang 
(2003),6 who argued that the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) has been rising in 
China recently as a result of excessive investment in the past decade. This and its 
consequent build-up of excessive capacity must have contributed to the diminishing 
marginal returns to investment. 
 
Finally, the policy of opening up as measured by FDI/GDP is found to contribute 
significantly and positively to productivity growth. This is inline with the observation that 
FDI inflow in China helps bring in new technology and managerial experiences. Other 
variables such as privatization of SOEs and urbanization produce insignificant positive 
impacts on growth of productivity. In our view, privatization and urbanization may help lift 
the initial level of productivity; they are more of one-shot effects, which may not last for a 
long time. It is not quite unexpected that education produces insignificant negative impact 
on growth of productivity as the technology improvement and technology efficiency are 
mainly induced by openness in recent China. 
5 Concluding  remarks 
Using provincial panel data from China, this paper finds a significant and positive impact of 
financial deepening on productivity growth in post-reform China. An important implication 
is that China should strive to further liberalize the financial sector and continue to privatize 
locally owned state enterprises. Both will be beneficial to economic growth. Though the 
importance of financial reform has been recognized widely, the banking sector reform in 
China is slow and incomplete. The same can be said to the restructuring and privatization 
programs of state-owned enterprises. Government intervention in the allocation of bank 
credit, directly or indirectly, is rather frequent, especially in inland provinces. This 
intervention slows down the deepening process of financial development. 
 
                                                 
6   Zhang (2005) discusses the institutional framework within which excessive investment is made by 
segmentation of Chinese local economies and by excessive entry of local governments in promoting local 
economic growth.  
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Our finding also has implications for tackling regional disparity in China. Since inland 
provinces have experienced a slower deepening process of financial development and 
financial deepening is conducive to productivity growth, speeding up financial reforms in 
the inland areas will help narrow regional inequality in China. In other words, the rising 
regional disparity in China since the mid 1990s is partly due to the divergent pattern of 
financial deepening process among provinces, especially between the coastal and inland 
areas. 
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